Recent studies show that what connotes an object is first of all a certain spatio-temporal structure. In this paper we describe some of the temporal features characterizing the temporal structure of objects: pre-existence, persistence, conservation of identity in spite of perceptive discontinuity, surviving changes in colour, size, and shape. We argue that time is an indispensable attribute for every type of object and briefly discuss the implication of this view with respect to a specific neuropsychological syndrome: unilateral spatial neglect.
The spatio-temporal structure of objects
What is an object? What counts as an object? Some researchers, such as David Marr, expressed a pessimistic opinion about the possibility of providing an answer to this question:
Is a nose an object? Is a head one? Is it still one if itÕs attached to a body? What about a man on horseback? These questions show that the difficulties in trying to formulate what should be recovered as a region from an image are so great as to amount almost to philosophical problems. There is really no answer to them-all these things can be an object if you want to think of them that way, or they can be part of a larger object (Marr, 1982) .
When considering the mind as a whole, MarrÕs pessimism is certainly appropriate: almost everything can be conceived as an object. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, object is ''something placed before the eyes, or presented to the sight or other sense; an individual thing seen or perceived, or that may be seen or perceived; a material thing.'' Mountains and trees, but also quarks, chairs and parliaments: all are objects.
At the earlier levels of sensorial analysis and with regard to mental processes as visual attention, the questions raised by Marr admit, however, a precise answer. Evidence from different experimental paradigms (change detection task, selective looking, multiple object tracking) demonstrate that what connotes an object in general is first of all a certain spatio-temporal structure (Jiang, Olson, & Chun, 2000; Pylyshyn, 2001; Quinlan, 1998; Sagi & Julesz, 1985; Scholl, 2001) .
Recent studies have explored what kind of spatial features a stimulus must have in order to count as an object. In the context of the multiple object tracking method-a paradigm that will be described in the following sections-Scholl, Pylyshyn, and Feldman (2001) have begun to examine some of the spatial factors which mediate the degree to which various clusters of features can count as an object. The results show a differential contribution of factors such as connectedness, part structure, and other types of perceptual grouping.
What remains to be defined in an experimental and structured way is the temporal structure of objects, that is the temporal features which connote objecthood.
In this paper we will try to show that time is not less problematic than space. A way to approach the problem is to consider a pile of sand and a pile-shaped object coated in sand. What is it that distinguishes them? Using the method of the violation of expectancy, Huntley-Fenner, Carey, and Salimando (2002) have Brain and Cognition 52 (2003) 192-196 www.elsevier.com/locate/b&c
